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Volkswagen’s Cost-Cutting Plan Faces Scrutiny As Traditional Methods Clash with Bold Promises

Volkswagen’s recent cost-cutting agreement, hailed as crucial for its survival amidst increasing competition and declining demand, leans heavily on the company’s longstanding tradition of collaboration between management and workers. However, this approach has sparked concerns among investors about the company’s ability to meet its ambitious targets, including reducing capacity and cutting 35,000 jobs.

The deal, which was reached just before Christmas, aims to tackle the company’s challenges, with workers and unions now engaging in discussions at factories across Germany to clarify the details. According to company sources, each plant will be given its cost-reduction target, with mixed teams of managers and labor representatives working together to devise strategies that enhance productivity. These targets will be reviewed quarterly, and if any interim milestones are missed, new negotiations may be necessary.

This method aligns with Volkswagen’s history of compromise and cooperation, but it also raises questions about its effectiveness in driving the required changes. The model avoids a top-down restructuring approach that might have been more decisive but could have led to unrest or strikes.

Investors have been left underwhelmed by the deal, with Volkswagen shares trading below the levels seen in October, before a sharp decline in quarterly profits. Analysts like Patrick Hummel from UBS believe the market needs to see concrete plans for long-term profitability, with a focus on how the cost-cutting measures will impact the company’s bottom line in the next two years.

Capacity Reductions And Plant Closures Remain Uncertain

As the deal progresses, questions persist about how Volkswagen will reduce its workforce and production capacity. Unions have been informed that the company is considering closing three to four plants, though Volkswagen has declined to confirm specific closures. The final agreement does include the closure of two factories: one in Dresden by 2025, and another in Osnabrueck by 2027. However, both sites may be repurposed for alternative uses, with potential new investors involved.

The company’s Zwickau plant, which produces electric vehicles, will lose one production line but will receive investment in a new recycling facility, which is set to begin operations in 2027. These new investments, however, are contingent on meeting cost-cutting goals, as Volkswagen’s finance chief Arno Antlitz made clear in recent comments to investors.

The company has also identified capacity reductions at its Wolfsburg headquarters, where two production lines will be cut. While Volkswagen has stated that the deal will result in savings of €15 billion over the “medium term,” investors remain uncertain about how this approach compares to the more direct route of plant closures.

Job Cuts Remain A Major Challenge

Another pressing concern is how Volkswagen will achieve its target of shedding 35,000 jobs. While the company previously promised to cut 30,000 jobs in 2016, its workforce size has remained largely stable due to new hires in other areas. The current plan to meet the target relies on not replacing retiring employees and offering voluntary early or partial retirement options. A clause in the deal guarantees jobs until 2030, a concession won by unions after Volkswagen canceled a previous job guarantee agreement in September.

Despite the uncertainties surrounding the cost-cutting plan, some analysts believe that Volkswagen’s CEO, Oliver Blume, has done well in navigating the complexities of dealing with unions and local politicians, who have significant influence over the company’s decisions. Moritz Kronenberger, portfolio manager at Union Investment, notes that although the deal may appear underwhelming, it represents deeper cuts than many had anticipated.

Blume’s leadership is under scrutiny. As Kronenberger points out, “Blume remains the right CEO, but the company’s cost structure must look very different in two years. Volkswagen needs to prove it’s ready for the future and can continue to produce attractive products.” For now, Blume’s ambitious promises have left him both vulnerable and accountable as Volkswagen seeks to secure its future in a rapidly changing industry.

How Venture Capital Can Help Create Startup Fraud

Fraud Is Often A System Problem, Not Just A Founder Problem

A new report from Imperial College London and Emlyon Business School examines how venture capital-backed founders commit fraud and how investors can unintentionally create the conditions for it.

Published in June, the study draws on cases pursued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice between 2000 and 2023. Its central conclusion is that fraud is not solely a founder problem, but can also stem from the incentives, expectations and governance structures surrounding startups.

High Expectations, Higher Risks

Several high-profile cases, including Charlie Javice of Frank, Gökçe Güven of Kalder, Do Kwon of Terraform Labs, and Alexander and Valerie Lau Beckman of GameOn, have intensified debate over where ambitious fundraising ends and fraud begins.

“Fraud is much more common and normalized in the startup world than we are ready to admit and accept,” Tim Weiss, one of the report’s authors, told TechCrunch.

Weiss also cited a University of Toronto study covering 654 fraud cases involving U.S. venture-backed startups between 2000 and 2023. Although fraud remained relatively rare, venture-backed companies were more likely to face fraud charges than non-VC-backed firms, while startups launched during overheated investment markets were 19% more likely to commit fraud later.

According to Weiss, pressure from investors and boards to deliver rapid growth can encourage misconduct, particularly in fast-moving sectors such as artificial intelligence.

The Three Stages Of “Façading”

The report, co-authored by Weiss and Nevena Radoynovska, identifies a three-stage process the authors call “façading.”

Surface façading begins with exaggerated claims about a company’s progress or traction. Reinforced façading involves creating evidence to support those claims, including fabricated contracts, invoices or revenue records. Deep façading extends the deception to the product itself through fake demonstrations and staged proof points.

Rather than beginning with a single act of fraud, the report argues that misconduct often develops gradually as founders attempt to sustain increasingly unrealistic expectations.

Investors Also Shape The Conditions For Fraud

One of the report’s central arguments is that investors are not always passive victims of founder misconduct. In some cases, they help create the conditions in which fraud becomes more likely.

According to the researchers, venture capital can “co-create fraud” by continuing to back founders who have previously been accused of misconduct, signaling that such behavior carries few long-term consequences. A separate University of Toronto study found little evidence that founders accused of fraud struggle to raise funding for new ventures, even when earlier cases attracted significant media attention.

“New investors and the broader VC market do not penalize past misconduct,” the report said, linking that pattern to Silicon Valley’s long-standing tolerance for failure.

Governance Plays A Critical Role

The University of Toronto study also identified governance as a key factor. Startups with founder-controlled boards were twice as likely to commit fraud as companies with investor-controlled or shared-control boards.

It also found that venture-backed companies going public were more likely to face securities class-action lawsuits within two years than private equity-backed firms. As startups remain private for longer while raising larger funding rounds, Weiss argues that governance has not kept pace with their growing scale.

“Founders do not have a professional body or association that could govern or enforce rules of entrepreneurial and investor conduct on how to be a good founder and what reasonable growth expectations are,” he said.

Calls For Stronger Oversight

Weiss argues that regulators should take a more proactive approach by introducing routine investigations and formal audits once startups reach significant funding thresholds, rather than waiting for whistleblower complaints or investor lawsuits.

The report also calls on investors to accept greater responsibility when aggressive growth targets contribute to governance failures. According to the authors, stronger oversight by both regulators and investors would help reduce the conditions in which fraud can develop.

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